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Quinet, who knew his Germany so intimately, and whose admiration of some aspects of the Teutonic mind was so profound, spoke of German hate as something peculiar in the category of national antipathies . . . a corrosive hate, he said [six years later] lay beneath an ardent desire for power and for wider recognition of Germany's greatness, and kept the whole nation in a state of fever." The utterance of Goethe alluded to is as follows. Goethe had been saying to Eckermann that national hate is a special kind of hate, and he continued: "It always displays the greatest strength and energy in the lowest stages of civilization. But there is a stage at which it vanishes altogether."⁷

In the Victor Hugo Museum in Paris is a sheet of paper on which Hugo has written an exhortation to the Germans to come to Paris, Paris the heart of the world's intellectual life, the pole to which every free imagination ought naturally to turn. The Germans came a few years later, but not in the spirit in which Hugo had so ardently invited them. And some twenty years earlier Auguste Comte gave the following title to one of his works: "*Discours sur l'ensemble du positivisme, ou exposition sommaire de la doctrine philosophique et sociale propre à la grande république occidentale composée des cinq populations avancées, française, italienne, germanique, britannique, et espagnole, toujours solidaire depuis Charlemagne.*"

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THE PRAGMATIC METHOD

DEWEY'S essay on "The Need for a Recovery in Philosophy," which occupies the place of honor in *Creative Intelligence*, has aroused a great deal of comment and criticism. The essay presents the issues between pragmatism and non-pragmatic systems of philosophy in outline form, and with a minimum of detail. It affords, consequently, an excellent opportunity for the comparison of philosophic standpoints. The narrowing down of issues to fundamental propositions is frequently advisable in philosophy, and I wish to take advantage of this opportunity to make a few observations on the differences between pragmatism and idealism. The possibilities of such an inquiry are endless, and I must limit myself to the merest sketch of the ideas I have to present.

Although Dewey limits the object of his essay to "an attempt to forward the emancipation of philosophy from too intimate and ex-

⁷ Quoted from McLaren's article, p. 407.

clusive an attachment to traditional problems,"¹ it is obvious that he considers the issues raised in this connection to be vital from the standpoint of pragmatism. It will be advisable, before proceeding with the discussion, to summarize the fundamental argument of the essay. Hazardous though such an undertaking may be, a criticism that is to be honest and effective can take no other course. For the sake of convenience in reference, I have numbered the various steps of the argument as outlined. It should be observed that this outline does not pretend to be exhaustive, nor to follow the order of the essay. (1) Dewey contends for a thoroughgoing empiricism which shall base itself upon experience to the exclusion of all noumenal or transcendent factors. (2) He finds that the empiricisms and rationalisms of the past have fallen into error through failure to adhere to this standpoint. They have introduced non-experienced elements into their interpretation of the world. As a consequence, their formulations of the problems of philosophy have been incorrect, and their results out of touch with the practical problems of life. (3) This lack of empiricism has manifested itself most clearly in the problem of the relation of man to his world. The subject has been interpreted as a knower, who stands apart from experience and has no place *in* it. Such a knower is a non-experienced entity, illegitimately introduced into the situation. A true empiricism would treat the subject as a fact of experience, and describe it in terms of its experienced content and relations. Through the introduction of the transcendent knower into philosophical speculation, the older systems of philosophy became side-tracked on the epistemological problem of the relation of the knower to the known. This problem, with all its attendant problems, vanishes when the extra-experiential subject is dismissed. (4) In his attempt to give a truly experiential description of the relation of the subject to reality, Dewey calls biology to his aid. Taking man as an active being, placed in an environment partly favorable, partly unfavorable, knowing appears as a special form of activity having the function of enabling man to make the most of the circumstances amid which he is placed. Knowledge is thereby given a wholly empirical and naturalistic interpretation, and the agent no longer appears as a mysterious being operating upon experience from without. (5) As the result of this interpretation of man and mind the older problems of philosophy vanish, attention centers upon the practical issues of life, and philosophy is brought into touch with the actual problems of conduct. Thus a needed reform in philosophy is achieved.

Each step of this argument calls for comment, but I must confine

¹ *Creative Intelligence*; p. 5.

myself to the issues that seem most crucial. The demand for a thoroughgoing empiricism is not peculiar to pragmatism, and may therefore pass without criticism at this time. The second and third steps of the argument present a criticism of the philosophical systems of the past and of the present in so far as they cling to the traditional problems of philosophy. As I read between the lines, Dewey means to draw a sharp distinction between pragmatism and all other systems of philosophy on the basis of their attitude toward the epistemological problem. A general distinction of this kind can not be pushed too hard, and I have no desire to challenge its appropriateness, especially since it appears to me to be well grounded in the main. I am certain, however, that critical idealism forms one exception to the rule, and since Dewey has a conviction to the contrary, the point would appear to be worth some debate.

Let a few observations suffice. In a large part of his discussion, of course, Dewey is following in the footsteps of idealism. This is especially true of his criticism of British empiricism. Again, the fact that modern idealism has attained its present position through a criticism of the systems of the past is an item not to be overlooked in estimating its attitude toward traditional problems. Dewey does appear to recognize, however, that modern idealism calls for special treatment, and the criticism which he directs against it is usually of the kind presented in the following passage from *Creative Intelligence*.² "More positively instructing are the objective idealisms which have been the offspring of the marriage between the 'reason' of historic rationalism and the alleged immediate psychical stuff of historic empiricism. These idealisms have recognized the genuineness of connections and the impotency of 'feeling.' They have then identified connections with logical or rational connections, and thus treated 'the real World' as a synthesis of sentient consciousness by means of a rational self-consciousness introducing objectivity: stability and universality of reference." The type of idealism represented here is not modern. That it still survives in some quarters I am aware, but in a historical survey one would be compelled to treat it as a transitional standpoint, which has long since been discarded by the majority of idealists.

Kant's philosophy might aptly be spoken of as an "offspring of the marriage between the reason of historic rationalism, and the alleged immediate psychical stuff of historic empiricism." Beginning with a manifold of sensations, taken over from empiricism, he was compelled to add thought to the manifold in order to account for the unity and order of actual experience. "A sensory manifold being all which is really empirical in experience, a reason which

² Pp. 26 f.

transcends experience must provide synthesis."³ But the experience so produced remains a compound of terms and relations, too angular and structural to be a representation of the experience which man actually possesses. Kant's "constitutive" view of reason influenced his followers for some time after his noumenal world had been abandoned, and idealism had grounded itself once and for all upon experience.

In general, however, the "constitutive" view of reason belongs to the psychological phase of Kant's philosophy. It is associated with his "Copernican revolution." Modern idealism has found Kant's chief virtue, not in his psychology, but in the logical development whereby he steps from a mechanical to an organic mode of interpreting reality. The tendency has been more and more toward the standpoint of philosophy as a "criticism of categories." "Idealism," says Professor Sabine, "has been in its intention first and always a metaphysics; whatever it stood for in ethics and logic was always understood to be preliminary to the establishment of metaphysical principles, or derivative from the consistent development of a certain metaphysical position."⁴ This is no doubt generally true as a statement of fact. It appears to me, however, that the logical method of idealism, the careful scrutiny of means and methods which invariably precedes its metaphysical undertakings, may be regarded as more characteristic of the school than any special type of metaphysics that has been produced.

The logical approach to philosophy has certain implications which have, I believe, been overlooked by its critics. The standpoint is instrumental. It recognizes that our categories are continually changing, never final. The process of criticism inevitably makes manifest the human and empirical character of the forms of reflective thought. It shows that each mode of interpretation has an application to a particular subject-matter, and that any attempt to interpret reality at large in terms of a few limited categories must result in failure. It may be that our knowledge constitutes some kind of a whole, or system. It is possible that the basis of such a system of knowledge might be found in a type of relationship that underlies the more obvious forms. But that is conjecture. For the present we are restricted to logical methods which are divergent in form and application. It sometimes happens that a particular logical system is "ejected" into reality, or hypostatized. The error is not peculiar to idealism, but where it is committed by an idealist there would appear to be some basis for Dewey's charge that reality

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 18.

⁴ "Philosophical and Scientific Specialization," *Philosophical Review*, Vol. XXVI. (January), 1917, p. 19.

is looked upon as a rational system constituted by objective thought. (A careful distinction must be made between unconscious hypostatization and the deliberate "trying-on" of logical forms.) Setting aside incidental exceptions, it seems clear to me that the natural development of idealism is away from the "constitutive" view, toward a method of criticism and "ideal experiment" which is thoroughly empirical.

A logical instrumentalism of the type described carries no metaphysical implications of its own. A critical idealist can forego metaphysical inquiry with as much grace as a pragmatist. He need not suppose that reality has an eternally fixed nature. The Absolute and the Whole do not occupy a necessary place in his vocabulary. The standpoint does demand, however, that the metaphysician shall be cautious and deliberate in the choice of the concepts whereby he interprets the world. Let him scrutinize the instruments which have been provided, consider their fitness for the task in hand, and use each in its proper place and connections. Such a logical inquiry has no specific connection with the problem of the possibility of knowledge. It does not rest upon any particular interpretation of the relation of the knower to the known. It depends only on the simple observation that our methods of knowledge are limited in scope, but capable of development. Through criticism the capabilities of each method may be tested and new methods brought to light.

The attitude of idealism toward the epistemological problem is partly governed by this method. Granting that the relation of the subject to reality must be concretely defined, it does not follow that it can be defined biologically to any better advantage than it can chemically or physically. All these methods may contribute something, but none is exhaustive. Human nature does not lend itself to easy definition. There are facts about the mental life that baffle analysis. These can not be left out of reckoning. The chief business of philosophy appears to be the explanation of such facts as refuse to submit to established modes of interpretation. But this would necessitate the projection and "trying-on" of new categories and logical forms. Idealism does not, therefore, give a biological explanation of intelligence, even though it insists upon a concrete interpretation of the subject-object relationship. "It knows no egocentric predicament," says Creighton, "because it recognizes no ego 'alone with its states,' standing apart from the order of nature and from a society of other minds. It thus dismisses as unmeaning those problems which are sometimes called 'epistemological,' as to how the mind as such can know reality as such."⁵

⁵ "Two Types of Idealism," *Philosophical Review*, Vol. XXVI. (September) 1917, p. 522.

In passing on to a consideration of the fourth part of the argument outline above I hope to draw more clearly the distinction, which has already begun to appear, between the pragmatic and the critical methods. In this connection Dewey's entire preoccupation with the problem of the relation of the subject to its experience should prove significant. A false formulation of this problem (the epistemological formulation) is held responsible for the artificialities of traditional philosophy. Because of this fact a tremendous reform may be achieved by substituting an empirical account of this relationship for the older non-empirical formulation. The empirical restatement of the problem must proceed by way of biology.

Organism-in-relation-to-environment is the key which, for Dewey, unlocks all the doors of philosophy. To this typical situation he refers all the problems of intelligence and conduct. From it he derives all his illustrations and formulas. Ask a pragmatist to solve a problem and he refers you to the organism-environment situation with the same promptness that a Christian Scientist displays in reaching for his *Key to the Scriptures*. The pragmatic method appears to consist in restating all problems in terms of the organism-environment situation, a procedure which involves no other logic than that employed in translation. It seems to be not so much a method as a recipe, or set of directions.

To repeat again, the difficulty is that pragmatism adopts the methods of biology with too little criticism. Has empiricism no recourse save to the methods of biology? Has philosophy become so bankrupt that it must borrow its categories from science? Says Dewey: "A belief in organic evolution which does not extend unreservedly to the way in which the subject of experience is thought of, and which does not strive to bring the entire theory of experience and knowing into line with biological and social facts, is hardly more than Pickwickian."⁶ It appears that one might have a firm belief in the efficiency of organic evolution in the field of biology without conceding it a similar potency in the field of mind and morals. There is a sense in which knowing may legitimately be regarded as "extra-natural." It may, that is, be of such a character that it can not be explained by any method which reflective thought has so far developed. As it escapes, by reason of its fullness and variety, from the mechanical and sensationalistic modes of interpretation, so it may be too complex for comprehension under the biological and organic conceptions. From this standpoint, the attempt to make biology the be-all and end-all in the explanation of mind is as premature as it is audacious.

I would not urge the point so strongly were it not for my con-

⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 35.

viction that this mode of philosophizing is non-empirical and stultifying in its effects. It is what I have got into the habit of calling a "nothing-but" type of philosophy. It reduces the great variety and complexity of our mental activity to a single type. Knowing is nothing but an indirect mode of activity; the moral is nothing but the expedient in the way of our conduct; theory is only projected action. Any system that explains by reducing, that "nothing-buts" or epiphenomenalizes the facts of experience is, to my way of thinking, walking backwards. A true empiricism will leave each fact of experience as it finds it, undiminished in content and richness of possibility. Pragmatism, to put the matter briefly, attempts to explain the whole by the part; experience by one of its typical situations. "Knowing," Dewey assures us, "must be described by discovering what particular mode—qualitatively unique—of doing and suffering it is."⁷ An appeal to experience—that appeal which so delights the "immediate empiricist"—will show that knowing is very seldom experienced as a form of doing and suffering. Nor is it experienced as a form of activity, direct or indirect. In the situation of tension, adjustment, and response, a very special situation, it is, of course, true that I am seeking a mode of activity for dealing with a practical problem. But only a small part of our knowing is of this type. I repeat, that to reduce all knowing to the one form is non-empirical and false to experience.

A criticism of this kind should be accompanied by illustrations and references to specific situations, but I must confine myself at this time to a general statement of my objections to the method of pragmatism. It may be summed up in the statement that pragmatism can not do full justice to the mental and spiritual life of man because of the limitations of its biological mode of interpretation. It is not so much wrong as it is inadequate. Dewey expressed himself on this matter several years ago as follows: "Certainly unction seems to have descended upon epistemology, in apostolic succession, from classic idealism; so that neo-Kantianism is rarely without a tone of edification, as if feeling itself the patron of man's spiritual interests in contrast to the supposed crudeness and insensitiveness of naturalism and empiricism."⁸ I hope that my attitude will not be attributed to mere sanctimoniousness. After all our science there remains a mass of phenomena still to be explained. These are not physical in nature, nor are they biological. No progress can be made by attempting to force them into molds which are not adapted to receive them. The mental life of man is too complex, too fine and subtle, to be comprehensible in biological

⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 37.

⁸ *Influence of Darwin on Philosophy*, 1910, p. 201.

terms. From the standpoint of a true empiricism, which renders every fact its due, the attempt to explain intelligence as an instrument of adaptation appears hopeless. If there is something skeptical in this attitude, it is at least open-eyed.

But it is not truly skeptical, for it has a positive basis. It is founded on the belief that progress can be made toward the development of new forms of thought. From this standpoint philosophy has no more important business than the discovery of new modes of interpretation which shall be adequate for the explanation of those phenomena which baffle routine methods. But progress in this direction will never be achieved by limiting philosophical thought to the employment of the biological modes of reflection.

If I have spoken of the method of idealism as a "criticism of categories," I have not intended to imply that its attention is devoted to a search for the "pure" forms of thought. Thought is always concrete. Out of relation to things thought is like a hand that has been severed from the body. This is to say that thought and reality must be studied together. The methods of physics would be wholly unintelligible apart from their application, and can only be studied in operation. Nevertheless, they lend themselves to examination and criticism. Methods may be discussed as methods. This empirical form of criticism is, according to my understanding, the essence of the critical method in philosophy. Pragmatism, by stopping short at biology, ceases to be truly empirical and experimental.

There must be an element of adventure, of pure speculation, in philosophical inquiry. Intelligence must be free to play upon the world without restriction. Fancy and intuition are not without results when the purpose is sincere. Let us then by all means have metaphysics, which is nothing more than an attempt to get beyond the obvious, and attain a new understanding of the world in which we live. In speaking of the development of modern idealism, Bosanquet says: "All difficulties about the general possibility—the possibility in principle—of apprehending reality in knowledge and perception were flung aside as antiquated lumber. What was undertaken was the direct adventure of knowing; of shaping a view of the universe which should include and express reality in its completeness. The test and criterion were not any speculative assumption of any kind whatever. They were the direct work of the function of knowledge in exhibiting what could and what could not maintain itself when all the facts were confronted and set in the order they themselves demanded. The method of inquiry was ideal experiment."⁹ I can not see, for my part, how such speculation is to be

⁹ "Realism and Metaphysics," *Philosophical Review*, Vol. XXVI., (January) 1917, p. 8.

avoided if there is to be any development in the sphere of reflective thought. Dewey assures us that philosophy is vision, imagination, reflection. But within the limits of the same page he asserts: "Philosophy recovers itself when it ceases to be a device for dealing with the problems of philosophers and becomes a method, cultivated by philosophers, for dealing with the problems of men."¹⁰ There has never been an honest philosophy which was not an attempt to cope with "the problems of men" (I presume that philosophers are men). But there are problems and problems. Who can say which is most important? Who can dictate the direction which philosophical inquiry is to take? It is best to let reason follow its own paths, without let or hindrance. In that programme lies the hope of man, unless history has recently turned pragmatist.

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CEREMONIAL IMPATIENCE

ENGAGED in studying what I have called the element of reluctance, of holding back, in ceremonialism,¹ that unwillingness to meet the changes of life until they become inevitable which leads to crisis ceremonials, one becomes aware of a complementary feeling, also a formalized feeling, a kind of impatience to meet the change and, as we say, get it over. It is this impulse or tendency as it expresses itself in crisis or epochal ceremonial that we may call ceremonial impatience.² In the Greek word for rite, *têlêtê*, and perhaps in the Hopi word *passiohti* this attitude is summarized. *Têlêtê* means rite of growing up, becoming complete. The term was applied primarily to the initiation ceremony of puberty and then to weddings and funerals.³ *Passiohti* sometimes means "ended," "completed," and sometimes it appears to mean "to hold a ceremony."⁴

¹⁰ *Op. cit.*, p. 65.

¹ E. C. Parsons, "Holding Back in Crisis Ceremonialism," *American Anthropologist*, January-March, 1916.

² In literature Joseph Conrad has well described it as the desire for finality which expresses itself through literary "solution by rewards and punishments, by crowned love, by fortune, by a broken leg, or a sudden death," the desire for finality "for which our hearts yearn with a longing greater than the longing for the loaves and fishes of this earth." And Conrad adds, "Perhaps the only true desire of mankind . . . is to be set at rest." (*The North American Review*, April, 1916.)

³ Jane Ellen Harrison, *Ancient Art and Ritual*, p. 112. New York and London, 1913.

⁴ H. R. Voth, *The Oraibi Powamu Ceremony*. *Field Columbian Mus. Pub.* 61, Anthropol. Ser. III., No. 2, p. 133, n. 4.